Samsara/audit/SECURITY_AUDIT.md

Samsara security and healthcare-data audit

Audit date: 2026-10-30. Method: offline, source-only review. Overall assessment: High risk against the stated healthcare production requirements; not ready for production approval. This is not a HIPAA compliance certification, legal determination, penetration test, vulnerability-database scan, or evidence that an actual patient-data breach occurred.

Scope, provenance and limitations

Reviewed the available working-tree Python application, PowerShell modules, schema, dependency declarations, tooling, tests, fixtures, documentation and artifact metadata. All application entry points and first-party source files were examined; static AST/import/call inventories and text searches were used without importing or running the application. Read installed distribution metadata and limited validator source to establish dependencies; the vendored third-party codebase/native binaries were not exhaustively audited.

The local .git directory is an empty read-only environment placeholder, not a usable Git checkout. Samsara.bundle advertises 57e716b71052a5c2e06bd2cdd121973c6c3f0359. That is an artifact reference, not proof the working tree is a clean checkout of that commit. The separately reported upstream 7fed3b9 reliability changes cannot be certified as included: no network request was made and remote Git history was not fetched. Audit the actual proposed release again after verifying its provenance. The snapshot manifest below identifies the bytes reviewed.

No collectors, application GUI, unit tests, PowerShell, package installers, scanners, production queries or network clients were executed. Tests were inspected as source, not used as runtime evidence. Only the new audit/ documents were written. No production reports or patient data were requested. Fixture flags identify synthetic test data; flags are not a general guarantee that arbitrary imported data are non-sensitive. Git-object history, opaque bundle contents beyond reference metadata, production ACLs, OS logging, native module behavior, binary provenance, telemetry and current CVEs remain Unverified.

Status convention: Pass confirms a narrowly scoped source-level control; Fail means code contradicts a requested assurance/control; Unverified means source evidence does not establish the runtime or organizational claim. A confirmed exposure-capable path is not confirmation that its actual values are PHI. Names, accounts and IP addresses are not automatically PHI; unrestricted values can become PHI when they identify a patient in a healthcare context.

Executive summary

1. Samsara cannot currently be described as PHI-free. Names, paths, identities, certificate subjects and other strings flow into memory, UI, temporary output and reports without a patient-data exclusion policy.
2. Open-file aggregation is not collection minimization. Get-SmbOpenFile obtains objects before aggregate projection; filenames and client/user metadata can enter PowerShell memory even when absent from final JSON.
3. Configuration-changing Windows collector commands were not identified. This supports a narrow read-only configuration intent. It does not establish zero host writes: temporary output, report files, process creation/termination, interpreter/native caches and OS logging are separate issues.
4. No explicit first-party HTTP upload, telemetry, database connection or remote Windows collection was identified. Arbitrary filesystem paths can nevertheless reach UNC/mapped/network-backed destinations; native dependencies/OS behavior have not been egress-tested.
5. Dependency assurance is incomplete. Broad direct version ranges, no lockfile/hashes/SBOM, unneeded installed Qt components and unverified native/transitive vulnerability status prevent approval.
6. Existing redaction is selective. Error-category normalization and omission of command arguments/private keys are valuable controls, but do not remove sensitive values from approved free-text fields or undo earlier processing.

Entry points and traced execution

Entry	Execution and trust boundary
samsara/main.py:5-24	Creates Qt application, configures process identity, imports the existing UI. Native Qt plugins and desktop integration enter the trusted runtime.
samsara/ui/window.py:19-54, :361-408	User action starts CollectionJob; local OS determines the Windows/Linux backend, a file invokes JSON import, and samples read bundled fixtures. The UI receives a complete data dictionary and derives assessment results.
samsara/collectors/windows.py:129-175	Fixed section dispatch -> system PowerShell executable -> JSON in temporary stdout -> section validation -> field projection -> final v1 validation. The data have already been collected and written to temporary storage before final projection.
powershell/Get-ServerInventory.ps1:1-56	Independent fixed section or full-envelope dispatch. Modules are dot-sourced from the checkout. Full mode lacks the Python timeout supervisor.
samsara/collectors/windows.py:178-193	Headless local Windows collection and exclusive creation of a user-selected inventory file.
samsara/collectors/linux.py:100-215	Local metadata/configuration reads and fixed utility invocations; separate CLI writes JSON. No remoting parameters.
tools/validate_windows_host.py:14-51	Intentionally performs real local collection, creates directories, exports JSON/HTML/sidecar, writes a diagnostic summary and prints status metadata. Not executed in this audit.
samsara/reporting/export.py:15-86	Public export functions write all supplied data without enforcing a privacy profile or approved output root. GUI calls them at samsara/ui/window.py:486-498.
tests/test_powershell.py:9-16, tests/test_linux.py:36-65	Development-only paths. Native test launcher executes PowerShell when present; some Linux tests mock commands but still invoke functions that read real local metadata/cron. Do not assume the suite is wholly host-isolated.

Confirmed findings

S-01 — PHI-capable free-text collection and export — High — Fail

Evidence: powershell/Get-ServerServices.ps1:5-7; Get-ServerTasks.ps1:12-16; Get-ServerCertificates.ps1:9-12; Get-ServerSoftware.ps1:8-12; Get-ServerStorage.ps1:17-19; Get-ServerSystem.ps1:24-31. All paths are under powershell/.

Service/task names, account identities, share paths, certificate subject/issuer and registry display fields are copied as strings. samsara/models/inventory.py:22-41 selects property names, not privacy-approved values. samsara/analyzers/dependencies.py:118, :145-167, :220-240 embeds names, accounts, paths and endpoints in evidence; samsara/reporting/export.py:15-25, :50-86 exports them. A healthcare identifier in any retained field can therefore reach reports and temporary collector output.

Impact: potential PHI processing/disclosure through metadata, not evidence that a patient record was actually collected. Action: define a CHS-approved field/source policy. Suppress high-risk strings at source or explicitly classify the workflow as potentially processing PHI and apply approved controls. Post-query redaction cannot prove that PHI never entered memory.

S-02 — Unrestricted provider objects precede redaction — High — Fail

Evidence: powershell/Get-ServerStorage.ps1:22-43 retrieves all open-file objects, processes full paths/relative filenames and client computer values, then exports counts. Administrative shares are excluded only after the broad query. Get-ServerTasks.ps1:4-16 receives full task definitions before selecting fields. Get-ServerCertificates.ps1:5-12 receives provider certificate objects before selecting metadata.

Impact: the raw SMB result includes potentially identifying file/client metadata in PowerShell/provider memory. Task arguments/descriptions/event-trigger payloads and certificate extension material may also be present in provider objects; exact provider materialization is Unverified without native inspection. Their omission from JSON is not proof of non-collection. Action: disable unapproved sources by default; redesign acquisition to avoid retrieving patient-bearing fields where possible, or approve it as controlled sensitive processing. Never use real PHI to test this boundary.

S-03 — Exports/history retain more information than the main report shows — High — Fail

Evidence: samsara/reporting/export.py:15-29, :39-41, :81-86; samsara/ui/window.py:401-417, :460-479.

An HTML save automatically creates a full inventory JSON sidecar. JSON assessment export includes complete inventory and evidence. Full data and assessments accumulate in self.records for the session; there is no data TTL, history size limit or explicit secure disposal. Neither export function independently validates/redacts its supplied dictionaries. HTML escaping prevents markup execution, not PHI disclosure. SHA-256 is neither anonymization nor encryption.

Action: approved minimal exports by default, separate privileged authorization for raw artifacts, central privacy projection before every output, bounded session retention, restricted storage and a documented purge policy. Label/hash/signature and access controls must not imply de-identification.

S-04 — Arbitrary output/input paths; no approved destination or file-permission policy — High — Fail

Evidence: samsara/ui/window.py:330-359, :486-498; samsara/reporting/export.py:16-28, :86; samsara/collectors/windows.py:185-186; samsara/collectors/linux.py:207-208; tools/validate_windows_host.py:20-43.

Paths may be local, network-backed, symlinks/reparse points or destinations outside an approved directory. HTML/JSON write_text truncates an existing file and follows ordinary path resolution. Sidecar exclusive creation is a positive control, but its existing-file read_bytes comparison follows the existing path and is unbounded. There is no explicit restrictive ACL/mode, encryption, destination allowlist or retention enforcement. Ordinary CLI x mode prevents overwriting an existing path, not network use or unsafe newly created permissions.

Impact: unauthorized disclosure/clobbering under the operator's rights; use of a writable hostile directory creates additional race/link risk. These are conditional, not observed exploits. Action: canonical approved roots, safe handle-based creation, reparse/symlink policy, least-privilege ACLs, explicit overwrite decisions and encrypted approved storage. Treat remote destinations as a separately authorized feature.

S-05 — Collection writes unredacted stdout to host temporary storage — High — Fail for a PHI-free/zero-write claim

Evidence: samsara/collectors/windows.py:60-92; samsara/collectors/linux.py:29-53.

Subprocess output is directed to a disk-backed temporary file before JSON parsing/projection. For Windows, this runs on the assessed local execution host. Deletion/closing in finally is beneficial but is not secure erasure and does not cover pagefiles, crash dumps, storage snapshots, EDR or transcription. Temporary-file ACLs and actual placement have not been tested on Windows. The 10 MiB size check is polled, so it is not a hard disk quota; collection can overshoot between polls.

Action: an approved bounded IPC/spooling design, no raw patient-bearing acquisition, controlled temporary storage if unavoidable, OS protection/retention and documented exceptions. Do not promise reliable zeroization of Python/PowerShell strings or SSD files.

S-06 — Full parent environment is copied into the Windows child — Medium — Fail for strict data minimization

Evidence: samsara/collectors/windows.py:57-64; powershell/Get-ServerInventory.ps1:9. Only PSModulePath is narrowed. Other inherited variables can include secrets. The application does not intentionally dump the environment into reports, but copies it in memory and passes it to PowerShell. Also review default registry GetValue expansion for expandable strings (powershell/Get-ServerSoftware.ps1:8-11); whether production values expose substituted environment data is Unverified.

Action: a tested minimum child-environment allowlist; preserve required Windows operation without carrying unrelated credentials. Read approved registry types with explicit non-expansion semantics where appropriate. Validate with synthetic secret canaries.

S-07 — Dependency/release integrity is not reproducible — High — Fail

Evidence: requirements.txt:1-2; samsara/collectors/windows.py:19, :45-64; powershell/Get-ServerInventory.ps1:15-17; samsara/core/startup.py:14; samsara/ui/branding.py:20-22.

There are no exact dependency locks, required hashes, build manifest/SBOM or first-party release verification in the available tree. Absolute script location and a system PowerShell path reduce search-path risk, but the checkout's Python/scripts/schema/assets remain trusted executable/configuration inputs without application-enforced release authenticity. A writable elevated deployment could execute altered code with that token. Qt/native image/plugin dependencies extend this boundary. No exploitation or compromised dependency was established.

The local PySide6 meta-package also installs WebEngine, PDF and Addons components not used by the application's imports. Installed capability is not evidence that these components are launched or transmit telemetry.

Action: immutable reviewed deployment ACLs, organization-approved signatures/publisher enforcement, platform-specific hashed locks, approved wheelhouse and full native/Python SBOM. Evaluate a minimal Qt distribution after functional/security testing.

S-08 — Allowlist/schema validation is not fully fail-closed — Medium — Fail

Evidence: schemas/inventory-v1.schema.json:25-80, :81-145, :167-190, :216-250; samsara/models/inventory.py:15-41; samsara/collectors/importer.py:10-53.

Nested objects generally permit extra properties; some retained keys (e.g. server.last_boot, optional network process/PID/direction metadata) lack complete type/value constraints. Projection is shallow, so an object in a retained but weakly typed field can preserve nested unapproved data. Arbitrary check names survive import and enter evidence/report text. Imports first deserialize all content, including discarded fields; live Windows projection occurs after temporary output has already been written. Arrays/strings/depth lack comprehensive structural limits despite the 10 MiB input cap.

The local jsonschema _format.py:395-402 registers date-time validation only when rfc3339_validator can import; that module/distribution is absent in the reviewed isolated venv metadata. _format.py:111-129 silently returns for an unavailable checker. Effective format enforcement is consequently not assured by merely constructing FormatChecker; alternative externally injected module availability is Unverified.

Action: close nested schemas, type/bound every retained field, enumerate check identifiers, reject unapproved structures before normal processing, enforce depth/count/value limits and explicitly assert the required format validators are available. Privacy classification must go beyond types.

S-09 — Offline/no-exfiltration is not enforced — High — Fail for an unconditional no-network claim

Evidence: arbitrary Path.open/writes in samsara/collectors/importer.py:11, samsara/analyzers/policy.py:19-23, samsara/reporting/export.py:16-28, :86, and tools/validate_windows_host.py:20-43.

No explicit first-party HTTP/API upload was found. Nevertheless UNC/mapped/network-backed filesystem paths can cause OS network reads/writes and authentication. Destination restrictions or egress policies do not exist in the source. Qt native dialogs/desktop integration, certificate validation, OS providers, endpoint security and dependencies have not been observed offline. Public URLs in documentation and the schema identifier do not themselves demonstrate network activity.

Action: approved local-only path policy, deny-by-default host/network egress as appropriate, and isolated synthetic runtime tracing. Do not disable enterprise audit/security logging to conceal data; minimize what is collected and establish approved logging destinations.

S-10 — No independently verified read-only/least-privilege release acceptance — Medium — Unverified

Evidence: local subprocess paths and all PowerShell modules; token check powershell/Get-ServerInventory.ps1:19-23; conservative permissions handling powershell/Inventory.Common.ps1:45-54; native test launcher tests/test_powershell.py:9-16.

No explicit assessed registry/service/task/certificate mutation was found. There is no automatic privilege elevation or remoting enablement. Those are positive controls, not proof of all native provider side effects or required access rights. Exact permission needs, silent provider filtering, module caches/logs and release behavior on each Windows Server version remain unverified in this audit. The application checks OS/permissions, not CHS change authorization or host ownership.

Action: a signed exact-release lab acceptance plan with synthetic data; standard-user and narrowly delegated accounts; registry/task/service/certificate/configuration diffs and filesystem/process/egress traces; organizational host/scope authorization. See the read-only and remediation documents.

Positive controls confirmed by source

• Production subprocesses use argument lists with shell=False; Windows has a fixed section enum, -NoProfile, -NonInteractive, a repository script path and no execution-policy bypass (samsara/collectors/windows.py:35-64). Linux callers use fixed arguments and timer-name validation (samsara/collectors/linux.py:20-32, linux_schedules.py:77-82). This does not protect a tampered deployment itself.
• Software reads both registry views and opens child keys read-only; no Win32_Product query (powershell/Get-ServerSoftware.ps1:6-12, :22-32). Registry handles are disposed.
• No explicit credential prompt, password storage, service restart, scheduled-task modification, registry write, certificate/private-key export, WinRM/SSH setup, clinical database query, packet capture or event/application-log collector was identified.
• Provider errors are converted to fixed categories rather than raw exception serialization (powershell/Inventory.Common.ps1:4-18). Import maps error text/codes and removes source-label assertions (samsara/collectors/importer.py:25-53). Raw errors still can exist in process/OS memory or external logs.
• HTML values and relative artifact links are escaped/encoded (samsara/reporting/export.py:32-36, :40, :82). UI text labels are plain text (samsara/ui/window.py:158-164). Generated HTML contains no script or external content source.
• Failed checks remain explicit and coverage is separate from workload risk (samsara/analyzers/assessment.py:37-78). Retirement review is always required. This is not a validated business-dependency or privacy classifier.

Network-capable paths

Path	Destination / payload	Conditions and disablement	Assessment
Report/CLI/tool filesystem writes	User-selected UNC/mapped/mounted path; full inventory/evidence or summary	User selects path; no local-only/approved-root enforcement. Constrain via future code/OS policy.	Capability confirmed; actual connections not observed.
Inventory/policy input and existing sidecar reads	User-selected filesystem destination; remote file read and possibly OS authentication	File selection/path argument or existing sidecar comparison; no remote-path prohibition.	Capability confirmed. Not an HTTP integration.
samsara/main.py:14-20 Qt/native file dialogs	Desktop IPC/portal/file-dialog providers; app identity, displayed UI and path metadata; possible network browsing	Desktop launch/native dialogs. No dedicated Samsara network-disable switch.	IPC/native behavior Unverified here. Qt signal .connect calls are not sockets.
Windows OS/CIM/storage/certificate providers	Local provider calls by source; possible downstream provider/OS/CRL/EDR destinations depend on host	Local collection/executable load. No -ComputerName or -CimSession supplied.	Native downstream effects Unverified. Do not infer remote queries merely from cmdlet capability.
Deployment on a network share	Python imports, scripts, schema and assets read from a network-backed checkout; OS file/authentication traffic	Source root is derived from __file__; no local-only deployment restriction. Approved immutable local deployment can avoid this route.	Capability conditional on deployment; actual destination Unverified.
Dependency setup in README	Configured pip index/mirrors or OS package repositories; package/version/platform metadata	Manually executed setup only; not GUI auto-update. Offline approved wheelhouse is possible but not provided.	Documented network-capable workflow; not executed.
Schema/URLs and helpers	Current schema uses an identifier URL, no remote $ref; urllib.parse.quote encodes strings, socket.gethostname obtains local name	Local parse/hostname. No current first-party resolver/connect/upload call.	No direct network request identified in these uses.

A source/credential-pattern search found only synthetic credential canaries in tests, not a confirmed live hardcoded secret. This is not a complete history/binary secret scan. No network requests or captured assessment data were sent during the audit.

Final management assessment

Question	Status	Evidence-based answer
1. Can Samsara potentially collect PHI?	Fail against the PHI-free requirement	Yes. S-01/S-02: unrestricted metadata can carry patient information into memory, temporary stdout and reports. Field names do not establish privacy safety.
2. Are there confirmed paths that collect or expose PHI?	Unverified for actual PHI occurrence	Confirmed PHI-capable paths include service/task/share/certificate strings and broad SMB objects (S-01/S-02/S-03). No actual patient values or production reports were examined; no actual PHI incident is established.
3. Is it fully read-only with respect to assessed Windows Servers?	Unverified	Source-level configuration mutation scan passes narrowly. Local execution still creates/terminates collector processes and writes temporary/report files; providers/caches/logging are not instrumented. An absolute zero-state-change claim would fail.
4. What can modify local files or other state?	Fail for approved-write enforcement	Export JSON/HTML/sidecars, CLI inventory output, validation directories/summary, temporary creation/deletion, child-process lifecycle and shell identity. Implicit Python/Qt/OS caches/logs are Unverified. Approved directory/ACL restrictions are missing (S-03-S-05).
5. Does it make external network connections?	Unverified	No direct application HTTP upload/telemetry/database connection was found. Actual runtime egress was not observed. Network-backed paths are allowed and can transmit inventory/authentication; the unconditional no-network control fails, and native/OS/dependency behavior is unverified (S-09).
6. Are all dependencies identified and justified?	Fail	Direct and discoverable Python dependencies are inventoried; unused Qt components, native closure, exact Windows versions/provenance and CVEs remain unresolved. No reproducible release lock/SBOM (S-07).
7. What prevents production approval?	Fail — approval not supportable	PHI-capable acquisition/exports, unapproved storage/egress, incomplete release/dependency integrity and native/least-privilege evidence; no completed organizational privacy/security review.
8. What must change before proposing CHS deployment?	Fail — not ready	Close P0/P1 items in REMEDIATION_PLAN.md, define the allowed-data/read-only model, validate exact release in a synthetic isolated lab and obtain CHS security/privacy/operations approvals. Successful code tests alone cannot establish HIPAA compliance.

Deliverables and evidence assurance

• Collector data flow and PHI exposure
• Read-only command, write and privilege verification
• Dependencies, native runtime and outstanding scans
• Prioritized remediation and acceptance plan

The final audit integrity check compares pre-existing source/artifact hashes against the initial snapshot; its result is recorded below. No remediation has been implemented as part of this audit.

Snapshot manifest and no-change verification

Verified 74 pre-existing first-party/source/artifact files unchanged against the initial audit snapshot. Only the five requested Markdown documents under audit/ were created. The hash scope excludes the environment-owned .git/.aws/.codex/.agents placeholders, the third-party .venv, bytecode caches and the new audit documents. Those exclusions are scope boundaries, not proof of their contents or integrity.

Snapshot SHA-256: a8fc056071b1d519097a2b07bcf2d7fd3678408b3124972260eb5a593718ca1c. Reproduction: compute SHA-256 of each listed file's bytes, serialize the path-to-hash dictionary using Python json.dumps(files, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode(), then SHA-256 that serialization. These hashes identify the reviewed snapshot; they are not a digital signature or evidence of release publisher authenticity.

Reviewed file/artifact	SHA-256
.gitignore	4586fa19892a2c7b5edd2f13882c6b0243e629a55b85478cdd4563fb236cf6f3
App Logo/Samsara Logo.jpg	469796ad788c77a8c4e5cc30e36f6884c4d76182b45d3894413554ad9d0ec421
README.md	ca505acd1777e7e8f2c8e025823980dc7a529bb3b291b89b0ad8c33ce3dc8986
Samsara.bundle	95f6c32d41f81b245c0c854210c94af6ebd7ec17c0fdcc72c49130d8fe50ce00
docs/DEVELOPMENT.md	9775086dd05281fd0312e00bdb756baa855057f3e268421494656e59f9a6aa88
docs/IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md	bbca88844a99de02a79d1c0515d9aacdaeb26a986fab4d85df850036862b3ab4
docs/PLATFORMS.md	544d0d3703bf77fe0021477f15e6290eb0aab4b4d9ab2b9cf143bf88f4246a04
docs/SCORING.md	81899ab358ed8a3042b9dcde04aa303df0e6762a857b9cfe6f3b56f459ff034e
powershell/Get-ServerCertificates.ps1	dc54aa83d7814b22319a83fca64266927ead7a53a1d2416ec12e79afe6ea4d49
powershell/Get-ServerInventory.ps1	cd5cea83271018370b13007e6a5ffcbc40d2a5828b58a9a6af60a8c9ebf84206
powershell/Get-ServerNetwork.ps1	dacee9c73e1f622e42285c920e3d0c912623bcb668a9fe2e384137923edd3caa
powershell/Get-ServerRoles.ps1	fa34a5d98d6bc7c78dda7dab0d0184be43d961e159c2f13a4d37a290f47e4999
powershell/Get-ServerServices.ps1	7a0a63c456ab21f465aaf608a36eb586021235a4abad44247100c0508384e5ff
powershell/Get-ServerSoftware.ps1	30e69b8cdc05c9c844b6a3c820ab22d674ef3d14a47ef0bd9c960b23c90f78d5
powershell/Get-ServerStorage.ps1	513c90a98e2ee7ada4be37be9c08b57488edcee47968b074dbf6d4a210478c7b
powershell/Get-ServerSystem.ps1	82a0bd12c30aafa7b9edfbe77d6dca655dec8019118f9290c53a22bd3657f9ea
powershell/Get-ServerTasks.ps1	bd716c72ec1584317702779e4ab9bfdecfc2da5616f1713d6a1ec21cb55844d0
powershell/Inventory.Common.ps1	4a43ebe04e1ed30f47dca3fbaa59aa2e601e7f7a6631563fddb90fe42b4264b1
powershell/README.md	20b9d647b9db95283f2374e6256b8acc605b61964508fe94fcf8671403dcb3e0
requirements.txt	a2c54b88e249231a1d295b2d69aa17bac18f310d53916a8f98eb58abfdbff210
samsara/__init__.py	01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b
samsara/analyzers/__init__.py	01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b
samsara/analyzers/assessment.py	019f8c1686c95a2bebacef05ed10d8029e32cf28b4d212f26cce89fcc48cb549
samsara/analyzers/dependencies.py	46960c00169ed9e591eb3682c126033b76859d39ddc3093005ad3b68c66ada14
samsara/analyzers/policy.py	68fddefc819503f5d6114567806f69c1e5c4db30922a8911f6f094c4ccce4cbf
samsara/analyzers/summary.py	31b66ff0270ffe1917cd5fcc72f1ce7be1159dff30c003dc205e5112e6139b67
samsara/assets/demo_inventory.json	106123be22212cd6f9863ee53be88a29872c52a90211920e05e4ca2d6a82e263
samsara/assets/demo_linux_inventory.json	480007766fc86891caec2b08d316ddbd4da72a9c6d2f71d10563770d087e2919
samsara/assets/samsara-logo.jpg	469796ad788c77a8c4e5cc30e36f6884c4d76182b45d3894413554ad9d0ec421
samsara/assets/scoring_policy.json	070b8b2ebcddb7fb7461ed74ca6d9bcc01cbacdb0cd0c681e18f0964e6a9064b
samsara/collectors/__init__.py	01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b
samsara/collectors/demo.py	d231c66ec17a732f4e0a43dd5b5b3617695fc32348a507d53afebdb81f75d3a5
samsara/collectors/importer.py	459282230e2cee80cbfb026e17ac9013cd20f2ba2999595fe972f310856c6e96
samsara/collectors/linux.py	1b5469b5a65b973f6b636236bd887bcae8b4f9d1559127bee9147ec1011ec748
samsara/collectors/linux_schedules.py	77c112f7904d7fd5c7cc99364edfb53417cf643a9e4b3fc50b67efa413625a61
samsara/collectors/windows.py	d20922cbb72c5aa1d105dcafa75ad5fa696a37730a7e29f1194503503f2e277b
samsara/core/__init__.py	01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b
samsara/core/detection.py	87d5d79b50220d82365108ae746dcc3d6b0d257cc0cb2e3a365fece02bb1efd2
samsara/core/startup.py	7488cb7ed8fddd96989baef52447c6d99ec1cc36d56451191c014b928c92356f
samsara/core/validation.py	0acf902316b6b408dcee064bf85acb5cddbe419c44a6a22bd883f11bf31bff6a
samsara/main.py	8f4ed1b7ca80fc3745f4ab09a9d8ace027cd64827ca98818adc1e94cfab12280
samsara/models/__init__.py	01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b
samsara/models/inventory.py	0d2e2d05fca23fde4f33003cd363f72ce72a1c7402c1e688eee01ee15eba88eb
samsara/reporting/__init__.py	01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b
samsara/reporting/export.py	248057ada2607039e9606745b72a942a9b3e3cecf15e6a918744a2ca09649a49
samsara/ui/__init__.py	01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b
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