Privacy hardening, remote-peer IP masking and review fixes

- Add privacy projection (core/privacy.py), private report storage, bounded
  process capture; omit identities, free text and unapproved paths
- Mask remote peer IPs: only loopback/host/wildcard stay numeric, others are
  reduced to remote_scope private/public (schema + scoring updated)
- Map ss TCP states to canonical names; ASCII-only numeric fields; fix
  "Microsoft Visual C++" product matching (Python and PowerShell)
- Merge 7fed3b9: -Diagnostic switch, serialization exit code 3, PS7 module
  path, UI error detail; keep hardened task/certificate collectors
- Add audit docs, privacy docs and regression tests

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-11-04 18:50:24 -08:00
parent 7fed3b9ab9
commit 610a3bb447
51 changed files with 2719 additions and 604 deletions

View File

@@ -1,53 +1,31 @@
"""Offline intake shared by Windows and Linux desktops. No code is executed."""
import json
import os
import stat
from pathlib import Path
from samsara.models.inventory import validate_inventory, restrict_inventory_fields
from samsara.core.privacy import minimize_inventory
from samsara.core.storage import require_local_path
from samsara.models.inventory import validate_inventory
MAX_IMPORT_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024
def load_inventory(path):
with Path(path).open('rb') as source:
local = require_local_path(path)
flags=os.O_RDONLY|getattr(os,'O_NOFOLLOW',0)|getattr(os,'O_NONBLOCK',0)|getattr(os,'O_BINARY',0)
with os.fdopen(os.open(local,flags),'rb') as source:
if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(source.fileno()).st_mode):
raise ValueError('Only regular local inventory files may be imported.')
raw = source.read(MAX_IMPORT_BYTES + 1)
if len(raw) > MAX_IMPORT_BYTES:
raise ValueError('Inventory exceeds the 10 MiB import limit.')
try:
data = json.loads(raw.decode('utf-8-sig'))
except (ValueError, UnicodeError):
except (ValueError, UnicodeError, RecursionError):
raise ValueError('The selected file is not valid UTF-8 inventory JSON.') from None
# A report wrapper is accepted, but its precomputed assessment is never trusted.
if isinstance(data, dict) and 'inventory_result' in data:
data = data['inventory_result']
validate_inventory(data)
# Keep diagnostic contents out of logs and exported reports. Diagnostics may
# contain command lines or credentials from external collection tools.
safe_errors = {
'access_denied': 'Current account could not read this scope.',
'command_unavailable': 'Required command was unavailable.',
'timeout': 'Section time limit exceeded.',
'overall_timeout': 'Overall collection time limit exceeded.',
'output_limit': 'Collection output limit exceeded.',
'powershell_failed': 'PowerShell could not execute the collector.',
'invalid_output': 'Invalid section output.',
'collection_failed': 'A local query failed.'
}
checks = {}
for name, check in data['checks'].items():
clean = {'status': check['status'], 'message':
'Imported check status. Source assertions are unverified; raw diagnostics excluded.'}
for field in ('started_at', 'completed_at'):
if field in check:
clean[field] = check[field]
if 'errors' in check:
clean['errors'] = []
for error in check['errors']:
code = error['code'] if error['code'] in safe_errors else 'collection_failed'
clean['errors'].append({'code': code, 'scope': 'Imported check', 'message': safe_errors[code]})
if 'permission_limitations' in check:
clean['permission_limitations'] = ['Collector reported limited read access; details excluded.'] if check['permission_limitations'] else []
if 'limitations' in check:
clean['limitations'] = ['Collector reported scope limitations; consult the inventory owner.'] if check['limitations'] else []
checks[name] = clean
data['checks'] = checks
return restrict_inventory_fields(data)
return validate_inventory(minimize_inventory(data))